Questions to Luce Irigaray by Ince, Katherine
 
 
Questions to Luce Irigaray
Ince, Kate
DOI:
10.1111/j.1527-2001.1996.tb00667.x
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Citation for published version (Harvard):
Ince, K 1996, 'Questions to Luce Irigaray', Hypatia A Journal of Feminist Philosophy, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 122-140.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1527-2001.1996.tb00667.x
Link to publication on Research at Birmingham portal
Publisher Rights Statement:
This article was published as Hypatia: a journal of feminist philosophy. Vol 11, No 2 pgs 122-140 1996. No part of this article may be
reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted, or distributed, in any form, by any means, electronic, mechanical, photographic, or
otherwise, without the prior permission of Indiana University Press. For educational re-use, please contact the Copyright Clearance Center
(508-744-3350). For all other permissions, please visit Indiana University Press' permissions page.
General rights
Unless a licence is specified above, all rights (including copyright and moral rights) in this document are retained by the authors and/or the
copyright holders. The express permission of the copyright holder must be obtained for any use of this material other than for purposes
permitted by law.
•	Users may freely distribute the URL that is used to identify this publication.
•	Users may download and/or print one copy of the publication from the University of Birmingham research portal for the purpose of private
study or non-commercial research.
•	User may use extracts from the document in line with the concept of ‘fair dealing’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 (?)
•	Users may not further distribute the material nor use it for the purposes of commercial gain.
Where a licence is displayed above, please note the terms and conditions of the licence govern your use of this document.
When citing, please reference the published version.
Take down policy
While the University of Birmingham exercises care and attention in making items available there are rare occasions when an item has been
uploaded in error or has been deemed to be commercially or otherwise sensitive.
If you believe that this is the case for this document, please contact UBIRA@lists.bham.ac.uk providing details and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate.
Download date: 01. Feb. 2019
 
 Name of Dept/ School  
 
French Studies 
 
 
Author (Year) Title. Journal, Volume, Pages 
 
Ince, K.L. (1996)  Questions to Luce Irigaray. 
Hypatia, 11, 1: 122-140. 
 
 
Version :  Post print 
 
Date :  1996 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This article was published as . 'Questions to Luce Irigaray' (on Irigaray and Levinas), Hypatia: 
a journal of feminist philosophy 11 (1), Spring 1996, 122-140. 
No part of this article may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted, or 
distributed, in any form, by any means, electronic, mechanical, photographic, or otherwise, 
without the prior permission of Indiana University Press. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTIONS TO LUCE IRIGARAY 
 
 
Kate Ince 
 
 
This article traces the "dialogue" between the work of the 
philosophers Luce Irigaray and Emmanuel Levinas. It attempts to 
construct a more nuanced discussion than has been given to date 
of Irigaray's critique of Levinas, particularly as formulated in 
'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas' (Irigaray 1991). It suggests 
that the concepts of the feminine and of voluptuosity 
articulated by Levinas have more to contribute to Irigaray's 
project of an ethics of sexual difference than she herself 
sometimes appears to think. 
 
 
 
A number of Luce Irigaray's most important publications since 
1980 have taken the form of poetic "dialogues" with key 
philosophers in the Western philosophical tradition.  Three of 
these constitute an unfinished tetralogy of texts devoted to the 
elemental: the four elements -- water, earth, air, and fire --
which were particularly significant to the pre-Socratic 
philosophers and whose rediscovery Irigaray sees as important to 
the reevaluation of motifs repressed within mainstream 
philosophical discourse.<1>  In addition to Marine Lover of 
Friedrich Nietzsche ([1980] 1991), Elemental Passions ([1982] 
1992), and L'oubli de l'air: chez Martin Heidegger (1983), 
Irigaray has written two essays (1991, 1993b) on the thought of 
Emmanuel Levinas, another philosopher who has gained increasing 
recognition in recent years. Irigaray has not devoted a book to 
Levinas, but these two essays can and should (in my view and the 
view of a small number of feminist theorists) be grouped with 
the texts in which Irigaray draws upon and critiques the 
thinking of Nietzsche and Heidegger.<2>  In accordance with this 
view, what I shall attempt to do here is explain the relation 
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between Levinas's and Irigaray's work and why it is important to 
feminist philosophy.  I shall subsequently trace the "dialogue" 
between Levinas and Irigaray in detail and try to construct a 
more nuanced discussion than has been given to date of 
Irigaray's critique of Levinas, particularly as formulated in 
"Questions to Emmanuel Levinas" (Irigaray 1991). 
   Several of the (feminist) critics who have written about 
Levinas and Irigaray have observed that Irigaray admires 
Levinas's philosophy.  They also seem to agree about what it is 
in Levinas's work that Irigaray respects, namely, the concept of 
the Other around which he develops his central concern, ethics. 
 So despite the critique of Levinas that Irigaray has 
articulated, Margaret Whitford notes that Irigaray "admires 
[Levinas] for his ethical approach to the Other" (Whitford 1991, 
151).  Elizabeth Grosz goes further, stating that "Levinas' 
conception of alterity is central to Irigaray's understanding of 
relations between sexually different subjects" (Grosz 1989, 
142).  The conception of alterity at issue is one in which the 
other cannot be represented in terms of any sameness of self; 
the other is independent and irreducibly other.  Alterity is a 
form of exteriority; the other cannot be absorbed into the self 
through negation, but remains aloof, distant, and different. 
   It is this unique conception of alterity developed by 
Levinas, a revival of Hebraic thought repressed by the Greek 
logocentric tradition, which Irigaray employs to articulate an 
ethics of sexual difference.  Grosz describes how the 
relationship of alterity and ethics works for both Levinas and 
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Irigaray.  Ethics arises as "a consequence of the self's 
necessary confrontation with the other.  The other is a 
necessary condition of subjectivity.  The other makes possible 
the subject's relations to others in a social world; ethics is 
the result of the need to negotiate between one existence and 
another" (Grosz 1989, 141).     Nonetheless, although Levinas is 
a vital source for Irigaray's conception of alterity, his 
ethics, like the vast majority of ethical theory written up to 
and during the twentieth century, recognizes only one sort of 
subject -- the male.  This presumption of masculinity is 
sometimes avowed and made plain, as with Levinas, whose subject 
is described as "virile" and "heroic."<3>  Much more often the 
subject of ethical theory is assumed to be gender-neutral, and 
abstract or universal principles are developed, which, it is 
claimed, can apply to both sexes indifferently.  Masculinity 
masquerades as neutrality.<4>  This failure to take gender into 
account in ethical theory has recently become of particular 
concern to feminists.  One central issue which gets left out 
when ethics ignores gender is, of course, embodiment: an ethics 
which is universalizable, such as Kant's categorical imperative, 
has to function independently of any particular corporeality.  
Issues of sexuality and the bodily self are among those which 
have usually been seen as peripheral to the subject-matter of 
ethics. 
   It is for this reason that the Levinas-Irigaray conjunction 
is important.  Levinas is one of few philosophers of ethics to 
conceive of either subject or other as embodied, corporeal 
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beings.  In Levinas's work subject and other are living, 
material bodies endowed with and using their five senses; they 
are incarnate and sexually specific.  Irigaray, clearly, has 
been concerned with questions of the body, sexuality, and gender 
throughout her work.  An exploration of the places in Levinas's 
texts where he directly addresses the questions of eros and the 
feminine, and of Irigaray's responses to them, would seem to 
have much to contribute to feminist philosophy seeking to reopen 
the question of the relationship of eros to ethics. 
   The traditional fault of patriarchal ethics is that it can 
conceive only of a male subject.  In Levinas's philosophy as 
expounded in Totality and Infinity, the space occupied by the 
male subject is called the realm of the Same.  As for Irigaray, 
the Same can be understood as the order of male subjectivity and 
social relations.  Most patriarchal theories of subjectivity 
classify woman as the Other of the Same.  This implies two 
things: first, a concept of the Other much less radical than the 
Levinasian one, in which the Other is opposed and complementary 
to the Same, and, second, that women are not subjects in their 
own right.<5>  Irigaray is concerned to overturn both these 
assumptions, to explore both the conditions necessary for the 
development of a female subject and the kind of alterity that 
such a subject would presume.  This is why she refers to the 
feminine, in her own work, as the Other of the Other.  (The 
phrase is also one of numerous points at which she is directly 
challenging Lacan, while not naming him as interlocutor; it is 
Lacan who insisted that "there is no Other of the Other.") 
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   In the passage following Irigaray's opening question to 
Levinas in "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas", it becomes evident 
that a conception of sexual difference in which woman remains 
the Other of the Same is precisely what she is accusing him of: 
"The feminine, as it is characterized by Levinas, is not other 
than himself.  Defined by 'modesty', 'a mode of being which 
consists in shunning the light' [...] the feminine appears as 
the underside or reverse side of man's aspiration towards the 
light, as its negative" (Irigaray 1991, 178).<6>  This is a 
surprising pronouncement for Irigaray to make, for several 
reasons.  The first is that although the relative importance of 
the types of alterity Levinas describes is a complex question 
whose difficulty is compounded by contradictions within his own 
texts, it does at least seem certain that the feminine 
represents one highly significant form of otherness: the 
encounter with the feminine forms a substantial part of the 
concluding section of Totality and Infinity. 
   Throughout Totality and Infinity the relation of Same and 
Other is described as a face-to-face relation: "the face" is the 
term Levinas uses to describe the other as it is encountered in 
the ethical relation between beings.  As a term, it emphasizes 
that direct human encounters are the very stuff of ethical 
experience.<7>  In the "Phenomenology of Eros", the section of 
Totality and Infinity in which Levinas's fullest account of the 
feminine is to be found, feminine alterity is also described as 
a face, the feminine face.  The feminine face is more equivocal 
than the face as it is described in the first three parts of 
  
 
 6
Totality and Infinity; "The feminine presents a face that goes 
beyond the face. [...] In the feminine face the purity of 
expression is already troubled by the equivocation of the 
voluptuous" (Levinas 1969, 260).  The equivocation of the 
feminine is, as we will see, central to Levinas's 
characterization of it in the "Phenomenology of Eros": it would 
be shortsighted and inaccurate to claim any equality between the 
face as it is described throughout Totality and Infinity and the 
feminine face.  But clearly, the feminine and the feminine face 
are forms of otherness, or alterity, which merit further 
exploration. 
   The second surprising element in Irigaray's pronouncement at 
the start of "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas", quoted above, is 
her description of the feminine as the negative of man's 
aspiration toward the light.  This is because Levinas 
articulates the relationship between ethical subjectivity and 
its Other as an asymmetrical and non-negative dialectic.  It is 
the infinitude and transcendence of the Other to the I which 
means that the space of the face-to-face relation is essentially 
asymmetrical: the other is situated in a dimension of height or 
transcendence to the I described most vividly in  the seventh 
part of section 3B of Totality and Infinity, "The Asymmetry of 
the Interpersonal".  The face-to-face relation can, furthermore, 
be described as non-negative because Levinas specifies that it 
is untotalizable; if the constitutive terms of the relation 
could be characterized as positive and negative, they would in 
theory be able to fuse and cancel each other out, in much the 
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same way as a proton and an electron do in physics.  "The force 
of opposition and of dialectical evocation would, in integrating 
it into a synthesis, destroy transcendence" (Levinas 1969, 151). 
 If the face-to-face relation is untotalizable, why call it a 
dialectic at all? The sense in which Levinas uses the word 
"dialectic" is perhaps closer to the Platonic sense of 
investigation by discussion than the Marxist sense of a method 
of dealing with (logical or social) contradictory forces.  
Elsewhere, Levinas explains that there is nothing Hegelian about 
the structure of the relations he describes, that is, that they 
are not historical, and that it is not a question of resolving 
contradictions.  When he uses the word "dialectic," it is to 
refer to a dialectic of being which leads not to unity but to 
plurality (Levinas 1979, 18-20).  It is with this aim of 
plurality that Levinas sets himself firmly against the 
Parmenidean conception of the unity of being which has dominated 
Western philosophy, instigating and maintaining the bias of 
ontology over ethics which he seeks to reverse. 
   As noted above, it is in the "Phenomenology of Eros," the 
section of Totality and Infinity on which Irigaray focuses in 
her first essay on Levinas, that his fullest account of the 
feminine can be found.  The characterization he gives the 
feminine here is less "the underside or reverse side of man's 
aspiration towards the light" than a thoroughgoing equivocation 
of light and shadow.  It is certainly true that in the 
"Phenomenology of Eros" Levinas aligns the feminine with 
darkness and the nocturnal, "the night of the erotic" which is 
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not dispersed (Levinas 1969, 258, 260).  This alignment can be 
set against the metaphors of light, openness and frankness 
Levinas uses to describe the face "proper": "The face signifies 
by itself; its signification precedes Sinngebung.  A meaningful 
behaviour arises already in its light; it spreads the light in 
which light is seen" (Levinas 1969, 261).  But although the 
feminine eclipses the clarity and transparency of the illumined 
and meaningful face-to-face relation as conceived of by Levinas, 
its obscurity is not unequivocal darkness, the diametrical 
opposite or negative of the encounter with the neutral (or 
masculine) form of the face. In other words, Levinas's feminine 
oscillates between shadow and light: as he puts it, 
"Equivocation constitutes the epiphany of the feminine" (Levinas 
1969, 264).  At one point earlier in Totality and Infinity the 
light of the face is explicitly associated with femininity, when 
Levinas, describing the idea of infinity from which the face is 
indissociable, refers to "the feminine grace of its radiance" 
(Levinas 1969, 151).  Although the purity of expression of the 
feminine face is "already troubled by the equivocation of the 
voluptuous" (Levinas 1969, 260), it is not entirely clouded and 
obscured.  To describe Levinas's feminine solely as the 
underside or reverse side of man's aspiration toward the light, 
as Irigaray does at the start of "Questions to Emmanuel 
Levinas", is to underestimate its potential as a deconstructive 
category. 
   Returning to the opening sentences of "Questions to Emmanuel 
Levinas", and comparing Irigaray's emphasis on the opposition of 
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light and dark with her treatment of the same binary pair in 
"The Fecundity of the Caress", her first essay on Levinas, it is 
evident that she polarizes the opposition much more in the later 
essay.  In "The Fecundity of the Caress" the background against 
which the schism between light and dark takes place -- the 
primordial half-light of the erotic encounter -- is evocatively 
described.  It is also in "The Fecundity of the Caress" that 
Irigaray exploits to the full the slighting and degrading terms 
Levinas applies to the feminine beloved (l'Aimée) in the 
"Phenomenology of Eros", where the beloved is said to resemble 
"an irresponsible animality which does not speak true words" 
(Levinas 1969, 263).<8>  Childishness, a lack of seriousness, 
faulty understanding and animality are just some of the 
characteristics attributed to her.  After the caress, the 
beloved woman is "relegated to an inwardness that is not one 
because it is abyssal, animal, infantile, prenuptial," whereas 
the male lover (l'amant) "rises up to the greatest heights" 
(Irigaray 1993b, 202, 194). For the male lover the transcendence 
and clarity of relations within the world of men-among-
themselves pulls him back from the brink, breaking off the 
erotic relation and abandoning the feminine Other to the 
unsignifying ultramateriality from which she came.  He returns 
to seriousness and his ethical responsibilities; she is returned 
to the abyss. 
   In "The Fecundity of the Caress" Irigaray catches the 
voluptuousness and equivocality of this encounter and exposes 
the abandonment of the beloved woman as the patriarchal gesture 
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par excellence; incapable of risking self-loss in the gulf of 
erotic desire, the male lover is (re)instated as the subject of 
love and the beloved woman as its passive object.  She remains 
adrift in the murky light of "profanation," a term Levinas uses 
to describe the discovery of the hidden as hidden.<9>  Light and 
equivocal darkness are divided and separated, but Irigaray 
insists that the night to which the feminine is consigned is not 
eternal and, more specifically, that the new light into which 
she will emerge will be different from the harsh, impersonal 
light of universal reason: "allowing herself to sink into the 
night, she calls forth from there a new morning, a new spring, a 
new dawn. The creation of a new day? From the source of a light 
that precedes and surpasses the limits of reason (Irigaray 
1993b, 197).  This is one point at which Irigaray's 
deconstructive strategy is evident.  The phases through which 
the deconstruction of a binary opposition must pass are 
described by Derrida and his interviewer in the interview called 
"Choreographies" (Derrida 1982).  First, there is an overturning 
of the opposition which gives the traditionally subordinate term 
primacy, and, second, the forging of new terms between which 
there is no longer a repressive hierarchy.  Strictly speaking, 
these are not two rigorously separable phases, but "a 
transformation or general deformation of logic" (Derrida 1982, 
72).  But the "phases" can be seen at work in just this way in 
"The Fecundity of the Caress", where Irigaray emphasizes 
Levinas's association of the feminine with darkness and the 
night in order to forge a new notion of light, and therefore a 
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new relationship of light and dark.  Irigaray's poetic 
transformation of this opposition stands in for transformed 
relations between chains of metaphysical binary oppositions: 
light, masculinity, universality, reason, and ethics, on the one 
hand, and darkness, femininity, singularity, emotion, and 
erotics, on the other.  The future envisaged for the feminine is 
one in which a modified relationship of light to darkness 
accompanies a conception of the erotic which has gained ethical 
status.  Ethics is no longer aligned solely with the 
Enlightenment values of neutrality and universality; ethical 
action is no longer required to be impersonal and free of 
emotion.  An ethics of sensation, materiality, and the body, an 
erotic ethics, can be substituted for the lucidity of abstract 
judgment.  From their role as the obscured and unthought 
substratum of metaphysical ethics, the body and eros become the 
shifting yet fertile breeding ground of new values. 
   Irigaray's treatment of the opposition of light and dark is 
just one example of the powerful, deconstructive form of 
rewriting to be found throughout "The Fecundity of the Caress". 
 The polarization of the same opposition at the start of 
"Questions to Emmanuel Levinas" shows the absence of this 
transformative rewriting.  In the earlier essay Irigaray's 
deconstructive strategy is applied to several of Levinas's key 
terms, and the concept that is recast to most sustained effect 
is "fecundity."  Irigaray's title both announces and begins to 
enact her strategic deconstruction of terminology, since in 
Levinas's vocabulary to ascribe fecundity to the caress is an 
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oxymoronic impossibility.  What the caress describes is the 
failure of erotic communion.  For Levinas this failure is 
constitutive not accidental, that is to say, eros can never 
accomplish the union of lover and beloved.  By insisting on this 
impossibility Levinas poses a direct challenge to Plato's model 
of erotic fusion: "Neither is the difference between the sexes 
the duality of two complementary terms, for two complementary 
terms presuppose a preexisting whole. To say that sexual duality 
presupposes a whole is to posit love beforehand as fusion. 
 The pathos of love, however, consists in an insurmountable
 duality of beings" (Levinas 1989, 49).  The gesture of the 
caress is defined by its inability to grasp, "the caress 
consists in seizing upon nothing" (Levinas 1969, 257).  Although 
its metaphor is that of touch, and the caress reaches out to the 
feminine other, it cannot hold on.  The caress is not 
teleological; it does not effect anything.  It is a gesture and 
not an act; it describes the tragic limitation or separateness 
of the erotic "I."  As Levinas puts it, "In a certain sense it 
expresses love, but suffers from an inability to tell it" 
(Levinas 1969, 258; see also Chanter 1990, 143-46).  As pity and 
suffering transformed into desire and happiness, it is situated 
on the side of voluptuosity, the first plane of eros to which 
fecundity forms the second side (see Chanter 1988, 43-4).   
   The crucial difference between voluptuosity and fecundity as 
they are set out by Levinas is sexual difference.  It is sexual 
difference which distinguishes the nature of the Other to which 
voluptuosity and fecundity relate.  Voluptuosity fails to 
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establish a relationship where fecundity succeeds.  However, the 
Other to which fecundity connects is not the beloved woman, but 
the son.  It is clear that despite Levinas's evocative 
description of voluptuosity, it is subsumed under the telos of 
patriarchy.  Eroticism is judged insufficient if it does not 
carry within it an entire future of familial happiness: 
 
    On the contrary, the ultimate end of the family is the 
actual      meaning and joy of this present. It is not only 
prefigured      there, it is already fulfilled there. The 
participation of      the present in this future takes place 
specifically in the      feeling of love, in the grace of the 
betrothed, and even in      the erotic (Levinas 1990, 36; the 
emphasis on even is mine). 
 
The carnality of voluptuosity gives way to the spiritual love 
evinced in the father-son relation.  "Pure eroticism," and all 
this expression could imply about desiring flesh, gives way to 
"sentimental love" (Levinas 1990, 37). 
   What makes this participation of the present in the future 
possible, for Levinas, is the passivity of the beloved woman, 
the support lent by the feminine to filiality or the paternal 
genealogy.  The hierarchization of the spiritual and material 
components of erotic love, the "transformation of the flesh of 
the other into his own temporality," is the aspect of Levinas's 
account of Eros subjected to the harshest feminist critique by 
Irigaray in "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas".  In contrast, 
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Irigaray insists that this passivity has its own power, which, 
rather than aspiring to the spiritual heights aimed at by the 
male lover, nurtures a slower and more fertile type of 
creativity.  The erotic plane to which the feminine is consigned 
carries within it its own type of fecundity: 
 
    Intimately tied to universal circulation and vibration that 
     go beyond any enclosure within reproduction. Turning in a  
     cycle that never revolves back to sameness. Continual and  
     patient engendering of an obscure labor. More passive than 
     any voluntary passivity, yet not foreign to the act of     
     creating/procreating the world (Irigaray 1993b, 195). 
 
Fecundity in Irigaray's sense does not transcend the flesh, but 
describes a material creativity that is set against the 
spiritual production of which the father's production of his son 
is the prime example.  Fecundity signifies a revitalized 
exchange between lovers. This is most clearly brought out in An 
Ethics of Sexual Difference, in Irigaray's reading of Diotima's 
speech from Plato's Symposium, where (according to Irigaray) 
Socrates fails to comprehend the extended notion of fecundity 
Diotima tries to explain to him.<10>  "Fecundity of love between 
lovers -- the regeneration of one by the other, the passage to 
immortality in and through each other -- this seems to become 
the condition of procreation and not a cause in its own right 
(Irigaray 1993a, 26).  Whereas giving birth, in Diotima's 
understanding of it, occurs "in beauty, with relation both to 
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body and soul" (Irigaray 1993a, 25), Socrates sees the divinity 
of the union of man and woman as residing solely in the 
immortality their love gives rise to in the child.  Fecundity is 
definable, for Socrates, only as an immortality that transcends 
the lovers' bodies; the end or telos of erotic love is the child 
as spiritual product.  According to Irigaray, this reduction of 
fecundity to productivity marks the failure of love, including 
for the child, whose role is reduced to that of mediator in its 
parents' relation.  Eros is diverted into the constitution of 
the family, political wisdom, and affairs of State; sexual 
creativity is channeled into production at the expense of a 
fertile "permanent becoming" in male-female relations.  The 
latter can only come about if the third term of the erotic 
relation is conceived of not as external to it, an exteriority 
exemplified in the "immortal children" of The Symposium, but as 
an intermediary (intermédaire) or path (chemin) between lovers, 
between what is mortal and what is immortal, between the 
sensible and the transcendental.  "Love is fecund prior to any 
procreation" (Irigaray 1993a, 25-26). 
   The mobile and material notion of fecundity Irigaray develops 
in An Ethics of Sexual Difference thus amounts to a wholesale 
redefinition of what Levinas means by the term.  In "Questions 
to Emmanuel Levinas," however, this feminist and deconstructive 
strategy -- the insistence on an impossible conjunction of 
fecundity and the caress -- gives way to a predominantly 
critical stance from which Irigaray accuses Levinas of merely 
gesturing toward "a future where no day is named for the 
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encounter with the other in an embodied love" (Irigaray 1991, 
179).  Levinas is one of few philosophers to displace the 
metaphor of vision dominating ontological accounts of 
intersubjectivity into a metaphor of touch, an emphasis which 
feminist readers have noted and which resonates with Irigaray's 
own reformulation of subject-object relations in the figure of 
the two lips.  But in Irigaray's view Levinas does not go far 
enough -- to the merging and fusion of bodies and identities 
whose fertility empowers ethics.  "The caress [...] does not 
touch the other" (Irigaray 1991, 179). 
   The absence of any physical communion of lovers is, as has 
been noted, an essential feature of Levinas's accounts of eros 
and sexual difference.  There are at least two reasons for this 
impossibility of communion between lovers.  The first is that 
separation is built into the ethics expounded by Levinas in 
section 1 of Totality and Infinity, as is evident in the title 
and the opening sentences of section D "Separation and the 
Absolute": "The same and the other at the same time maintain 
themselves in relationship and absolve themselves from this 
relation, remain absolutely separated. The idea of Infinity 
requires this separation (Levinas 1969, 102).  In the erotic 
relationship with the feminine separation operates similarly: 
"In voluptuosity the other is me and separated from me. The 
separation of the Other in the midst of this community of 
feeling constitutes the acuity of voluptuosity" (Levinas 1969, 
265). 
The second reason for the absence of any physical communion of 
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lovers is the priority given to separated being in the Judaic 
tradition, commented on by Levinas in an essay called "Judaism 
and the Feminine" when he says "For the Jews, separated 
existence will be worth more than the initial union" (Levinas 
1990, 35).  Unlike the Hellenic tradition in which, according to 
the fable recounted in Plato's Symposium which tells of the 
origins of sexual difference, the separation of beings 
represents a punishment for the overweening pride of original 
wholeness and perfection, the separation of the sexes in Judaism 
is declared by Levinas to be original.  To illustrate this he 
incorporates this separation into the story of Genesis: "The two 
faces of the primitive Adam from the beginning look towards the 
side to which they will always remain turned. They are faces 
from the very outset" (Levinas 1990, 35).  This image of an 
androgynous Adam is in fact the only figure of bodily fusion of 
the sexes to be found in Levinas's work.  It forms part of the 
description of the feminine which occurs in his speculation on 
the origin of woman, in Eve: "Did she come from Adam's rib? Was 
this rib [côte] not a side [côté] of Adam, created as a single 
being with two faces that God separated while Adam, still 
androgynous, was sleeping?" (Levinas 1990, 35). 
   Levinas does not, therefore, project any image of embodied 
union for the "future" of sexual difference.  But this does not 
imply that the subject of Levinas's ethics is disembodied or 
transcendent.  The ethical "I" is incarnate, dwells, and has a 
relationship of enjoyment (jouissance) with the elements (see 
Levinas 1969, sec 2).  In Otherwise than Being (1981) the 
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subject is described as an embodied sensibility, passive and 
essentially vulnerable.  Irigaray's critique of Levinas in 
"Questions to Emmanuel Levinas" is targeted at the erotic 
relationship of subject and other, but, perhaps misleadingly, 
implies that the subject of Levinas's ethics transcends the 
flesh in all its relationships with that other: "Levinas is 
seeking [...] neither the qualities of the other's flesh nor of 
his own" (Irigaray 1991, 179). 
   In the "Phenomenology of Eros" Levinas refers to only one 
form of community of lovers, the "community of sentient and 
sensed" or the "identity of feeling" accomplished in 
voluptuosity (Levinas 1969, 265).  This is rejected by Irigaray 
as "a call for communion in the secret depths of the sensible 
realm and not for a defloration of herself as a woman" (Irigaray 
1993b, 211).  Again, clearly, Levinas's erotics are not bodily 
enough for Irigaray.  It is perhaps surprising, however, that 
she does not observe how voluptuosity, by affording a form of 
community or identity between lovers, seems to thwart, at least 
to some degree, the separation of same and other on which 
Levinas insists throughout Totality and Infinity. 
   There may be no amorous exchange of the kind Irigaray is 
looking for in Levinas's "Phenomenology of Eros," but there is a 
reading of the body she does not appear to address.  Levinas's 
description of the body of the beloved woman states that "in the 
carnal given to tenderness, the body quits the status of 
existent" (Levinas 1969, 258).  "The carnal, the tender par 
excellence correlative of the caress, the beloved, is to be 
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identified neither with the body-thing of the physiologist, nor 
with the lived body [corps propre] of the 'I can', nor with the 
body-expression" (258).  Erotic equivocation extends to the very 
form of the body of the beloved: "In the caress, a relation yet, 
in one aspect, sensible, the body already denudes itself of its 
very form" (258). 
   This precariousness and lack of fixed form Levinas ascribes 
to the beloved in the "Phenomenology of Eros" seems to resemble 
closely Irigaray's descriptions of the female imaginary.  She 
defines the female imaginary as a mobile and shifting 
morphology, distinct from the values of unity and containment 
which have shaped much of Western philosophy, and which reveal 
how the Western philosophical tradition has been formed under 
the influence of an imaginary based on the male body.  It is 
because she understands Levinas's characterization of the erotic 
relation to be entirely shaped by the closure and self-
containment of the male imaginary that Irigaray accuses Levinas 
of not seeing the importance of the "shared outpouring" 
(effusion à deux) or "loss of boundaries" (effacement des bords) 
of erotic love (Irigaray 1991, 180).  This presupposes that the 
erotic body Levinas describes has the boundary or boundaries 
Irigaray says it does, that it has a fixed form.  But as we have 
seen, the carnal and the tender as described by Levinas "denude" 
the body of its form.  The self-containment of the erotic body 
is also something which the mutually constitutive roles of lover 
and beloved render far from certain. 
   Is it possible that the material exchange Irigaray describes 
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as fundamental to amorous relations is already at work in the 
"Phenomenology of Eros"? The type of boundary implied by the 
alternation of separation and fusion she sees as characteristic 
of erotic relations is a porous or mucous membrane which admits 
material interchange without total dissolution.  If this is also 
implied in the equivocal status ascribed to the body by Levinas, 
it clearly has implications for Irigaray's critique.  There can 
be no doubt about the secondary ethical status accorded to the 
feminine in the "Phenomenology of Eros," and about the 
derogatoriness of the terms in which "she" is described, but is 
Levinas's characterization of the body of the feminine as 
retrograde as Irigaray seems to think? 
   Irigaray seems to assume that the female form as described by 
Levinas has a fixed, essential being, a notion which it is hard 
to locate in Levinas's writing.  This is a tendency also 
uppermost in the second of Irigaray's questions to Levinas, 
where she asks how the other may be defined.  In one sense this 
question is unanswerable, since to define would be to seek to 
limit the one who makes infinite demands upon our 
responsibility.  The Other is no longer Other if it is seen as 
"a postulate, the projection or the remnant of a system, a 
hermeneutic locus of crystallization of meaning, etc." (Irigaray 
1991, 181).  In another sense all Levinas's work may be 
understood as the attempt to answer this question.  The other 
and transcendence are not defined, but met with, as and in the 
face, accessible only via interhuman experience.  When she 
criticizes Levinas for not defining the other, is Irigaray not 
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underestimating the difficulty and paradoxical nature of that 
task?  
   The body and its senses also appear to form the main sticking 
point in another of the differences between herself and Levinas 
Irigaray identifies.  The phenomenological relation of self and 
Other described by Levinas in Totality and Infinity is 
radicalized, in Otherwise than Being, to become what Levinas 
calls substitution, a sensuous exposure to the Other which 
precedes and exceeds the intentionality of consciousness.  For 
Levinas, substitution is a passivity that bears the burden of 
everything for which the Other is responsible.  It describes the 
very structure of infinite responsibility, the asymmetrical 
relation with the Other, as Levinas writes in Ethics and 
Infinity: "I can substitute myself for everyone, but no one can 
substitute himself for me.[...] It is in this precise sense 
 that Dostoyevsky said: 'We are all responsible for all and 
 for all men before all, and I more than all the others'" 
(Levinas 1985, 101).  A chapter on substitution is central to 
the development of Levinas's notion of ethical subjectivity in 
Otherwise than Being.  In this book he develops the concept of 
substitution away from ontological intentional consciousness and 
into corporeal and material terms: substitution is described as 
"making a gift of my own skin," as "giving to the other by 
taking the bread out of my own mouth" (Levinas 1981, 138).  The 
paradigm of substitution is the maternal body, "the body as 
passivity and renouncement, a pure undergoing" (Levinas 1981, 
79).  Maternal selflessness is here evaluated, extremely 
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problematically from a feminist standpoint, not as a constructed 
social attribute but as a goodness of the flesh, which exists 
for the other (unborn) child before existing for itself.  The 
structure of substitution is that of anxiously divided flesh 
that puts the Other before itself but is constituted only in and 
through its relation with that Other. 
   Irigaray opposes on two counts the structure of substitution 
as Levinas describes it.  She states first that it represents "a 
kind of formalism or disordered drift," "an infinite series of 
substitutions, an operation which seems to me non-ethical" 
(Irigaray 1991, 182).  The implication here is (again) that 
Levinas's ethics is not grounded in the body, that it is foreign 
to the passions of the flesh, an assertion that sits oddly with 
the sensuous character of substitution described in Otherwise 
than Being.  Irigaray's second objection to substitution, linked 
to the first, is that Levinas has not thought through the 
relationship of the body to sexual difference.  This adds a 
further dimension to the subordination of sexual difference to 
ethical difference Derrida identifies in Levinas's work in "At 
this very moment in this work here I am" (Derrida 1991, 46).  
Does Irigaray's reiteration, in "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas," 
of the way in which Levinasian voluptuosity "presents man as the 
sole subject exercising his desire and his appetite upon the 
woman who is deprived of subjectivity except to seduce him" 
(1991, 185) suggest an unwillingness to engage with the 
deconstruction of the priority of the ethical over the sexual 
which Derrida undertakes in "At this very moment..."? 
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   The privileging of the sole position of maternity in 
Otherwise than Being compounds the obfuscation of the maternal 
genealogy and of relations between women Irigaray reads in the 
philosophers of the metaphysical tradition, and works against 
rather than toward her sexual differentiation of male from 
female at all levels of the symbolic economy.  When, however, 
Irigaray points out for a second time that "a place of 
irreducible non-substitutability exists within sexual 
difference" (Irigaray 1991, 185), she does not specify what it 
is which marks out this place of non-substitutability.  If 
Irigaray does not make this clear at this point this is, I 
suggest, because it requires more and possibly lengthy 
explanation of the specificity with which she is using the 
concept of "place," which is distinct from the twin notions of 
position and identification employed by psychoanalytic theories 
of sexual difference.  Irigaray insists on the difference 
between the concept of identification and that of place: 
"Whatever identifications are possible, one will never exactly 
occupy the place of the other -- they are irreducible one to the 
other" (Irigaray 1993a, 13).  A primary way in which her refusal 
of the exchangeability of male and female may be understood is 
as a refusal of the Lacanian concept of identification which 
allows subjects to take up a position on either side of the 
divide marked out by the law of the phallus. 
   Not specifying that it is her interpretation and use of the 
concept of place which accounts for the non-substitutability in 
sexual difference she insists on seems, then, like an omission 
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in Irigaray's argument in "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas."  
Irigaray and Levinas seem to be using the term "substitution" in 
different senses.  The example of substitution Irigaray goes on 
to give, in which the lack of preparedness of the peoples of 
monotheism to assert that their God is a woman is cited as a 
reason for the persistence of non-substitutability, also 
obscures the difference between them.  Does the difficulty 
and/or remoteness of substitution at all levels of the 
socioreligious economy mean that substitution as Levinas 
describes it -- not an act, but a structurally passive 
relationship of responsibility 
-- is invalid? 
   The critical and often hostile tone adopted by Irigaray in 
"Questions to Emmanuel Levinas" marks a shift in approach from 
"The Fecundity of the Caress" which it is impossible to ignore. 
 Is it because she hoped to engage Levinas in dialogue about the 
subordination of voluptuosity to spiritual "fecundity" and of 
the feminine to the telos of paternity, and received no 
response, that she changes tack? Does the shift from 
deconstructive reading to oppositional and often aggressive 
questioning represent "a powerful, necessary and compelling 
feminist critique of Levinas?" (Critchley 1992, 143 n.10). 
   Critchley's estimation of the importance of Irigaray's 
intervention is made in distinction to Derrida's adoption of a 
woman's voice in "At this very moment in this work here I am," a 
tactic without which the redistribution of sexual marks between 
the feminine Other and the masculine economy of the Same which 
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he effects in that text -- the deconstruction of the priority of 
ethical difference over sexual difference -- would not be 
operable.  Whether Derrida's mimicry of the feminine is 
politically dangerous and calls for feminist critique is a 
question that cannot be broached without entering in detail into 
the relationship between deconstruction and feminism and its 
history.  That relationship can, however, perhaps be usefully 
compared to the (non-)dialogue between Irigaray and Levinas I 
have followed here, a communication or contact Irigaray would 
wish to be recognized as belonging to both ethical and erotic 
modes, simultaneously.<11> 
   But despite the nuptial potential of their respective 
initials (reversed and placed back to back, like the two faces 
of the androgynous Adam which figure in Levinas's version of the 
Genesis story, these generate the most sexually ambiguous of 
subjects, i.l.l.e.): Irigaray and Levinas make an improbable 
couple.  As an addendum to this unlikely relationship, however, 
I suggest that there is more ground common to them than either 
of the textual encounters initiated by Irigaray suggests.  The 
motifs that will guide the envisagement of this rapprochement 
are (once again) fecundity, voluptuosity, the threshold, and the 
sensible transcendental.<12>  
   The ambiguity that characterizes Levinas's descriptions of 
eroticism is an oscillation between silence and speech, or 
between secrecy and open, frank communication.  For Levinas, the 
feminine is this equivocation of language.  As we have seen, 
this ambiguity extends to the morphology of the feminine body, 
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which hovers between being and non-being, never presenting 
fixed, transgressible limits to the male lover.  Undefinable or 
constantly shifting borders also characterize the oscillation 
between oneness and twoness Irigaray finds in the female body, 
in the image of the two lips repeatedly touching and separating. 
The lips are a figure for a threshold (seuil) that is not a 
closed border, a limit whose significance is not that it keeps 
otherness out, but that it allows it to be hospitably received, 
redistributed and exchanged: 
 
    (Two sets of lips that, moreover, cross over each other like 
     the arms of the cross, the prototype of the crossroads     
     between. The mouth lips and the genital lips do not point 
in      the same direction. In some way they point in the 
direction      opposite from the one you would expect, with the 
"lower" ones      forming the vertical.) (Irigaray 1993a, 18) 
 
A crossroads is both a meeting-place and a parting of the ways, 
a point of passage between opposites which allows traditionally 
conceived-of dichotomies to encounter one another anew, regroup 
and follow new paths.  For Irigaray the female sex (le sexe 
féminin) is this chiasmic threshold: "A remaking of immanence 
and transcendence, notably through this threshold which has 
never been examined as such: the female sex" (Irigaray 1993a, 
18).  
   Unsurprisingly, it is only Irigaray who argues that the 
status and possibilities of this threshold have always gone 
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unrecognized, and that it is the reconnection of the 
transcendental to the sensible which will allow women their 
"permanent becoming" and refertilize the sclerotic relationships 
of the masculine symbolic economy.  This reconnection is, 
however, described by Levinas in quasi-identical terms as the 
mode of the feminine.  Alongside and beyond the critique 
Irigaray articulates in "Questions to Emmanuel Levinas", the way 
in which Levinas's feminine facilitates the creation of a 
passage between can also be recognized.  To develop and exploit 
Levinas's articulation of the feminine is not equivalent to 
asking him to speak on women's behalf.<13>  
   Another parallel with her project(s) which Irigaray might 
find in Levinas's writing concerns both the levels at which Eros 
has been understood as operating, from Plato onward, and the 
relation of a feminist erotics to temporality.  What Levinas 
terms voluptuosity falls short of the infinite relation with the 
Other established in fecundity.  For Levinas, fecundity has a 
stable, sustained transcendence that is missing from 
voluptuosity, whose relation with the face does not prevent its 
doubling back on itself.  In Levinasian fecundity, love has 
reached its telos, but voluptuosity, "this unparalleled 
conjuncture of identification" (Levinas 1969, 266) does not 
ensure complementarity or equal status between lovers such as 
exists between father and son.  Voluptuosity describes an eros 
that cannot be utilized for procreation, a mingling ebb and flow 
of desires: "Voluptuosity hence aims not at the Other but at his 
voluptuosity; it is voluptuosity of voluptuosity, love of the 
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love of the other" (Levinas 1969, 266). 
   Revealingly, the English translation of Totality and Infinity 
genders the Other male at this point, the necessity of sexed 
personal pronouns in English rendering "sa volupté" as "his 
voluptuosity."  But shortly afterward, Levinas's text makes it 
clear that the mode of volupté is feminine: the voluptuous "I" 
returns from transcendence to itself, but the self to which it 
returns is not the same self from which it departed -- a 
modification which is effected by feminine erotic difference: 
 
    The subject in voluptuosity finds himself again as the self 
     (which does not mean the object or the theme) of an other, 
     and not only as the self of himself. The relationship with 
     the carnal and the tender precisely makes this self arise  
     incessantly: the subject's trouble is not assumed by his   
     mastery as a subject, but is his being moved           
     [attendrissement], his effemination [...]. There is in the 
     erotic relationship a characteristic reversal of the       
     subjectivity issued from position, a reversion of the 
virile      and heroic I. (Levinas 1969, 270) 
 
Although the feminine is not accorded the status of the subject 
of love by Levinas, voluptuosity is thus strikingly similar to 
the "double desire" between the two sexes Irigaray describes as 
"a chiasmus or a double loop in which each can go toward the 
other and come back to itself" (Irigaray 1993a, 9).  Although it 
appears "autistic, egological, solitary" (Irigaray 1991, 180), 
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voluptuosity returns to the self only to move away again; "in 
this complacence it equally moves away from itself" (Levinas 
1969, 266).  Erotic voluptuosity does not coincide with itself 
at its point of origin, but describes an open series of loops 
that double back on themselves without completing closed 
circles.  The (feminized) subject in love is swept out and ahead 
of itself and maintained in alteration in this way.  The motion 
and rhythm of these repeated non-identical departures is, I 
suggest, the same as that described by Irigaray in the self-
displacing regeneration she calls "fecundity." 
   The rhythm and motion of these non-identical repetitions also 
reveal what may be called an erotic temporality at work -- a 
temporality of growth in cycles of varying speed.  Irigaray 
differentiates cyclical time from linear time, the time of 
embodied beings from the time of the machine: "As long as we are 
embodied, we cannot go beyond a certain rhythm of growth" 
(Irigaray 1993a, 74).  This rhythm is one in which pausing 
enables the subject to draw on material resources that remain 
forgotten and unused in an economy of the tekhnè -- the time we 
have become accustomed to under the reign of Western 
metaphysics.  Metaphysical time is a progressive, linear time 
that constantly accelerates: "Doesn't the machine unceasingly 
threaten to destroy us through the speed of its acceleration?" 
(Irigaray 1993a, 74).  What Irigaray calls "man's" "vital speed, 
a growth speed that is compatible with all his senses and 
meanings" (Irigaray 1993a, 73), what I am here calling an erotic 
temporality, requires braking as well as acceleration, periods 
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for the replenishment of resources.  Only this renewed 
relationship to a natural economy of "the vitality of the soil 
and the fertility of the great cosmic rhythms" (Irigaray 1993a, 
100) can found a new ethical order.  For the drive-based 
mechanical bodily economy of tension and discharge which has 
dominated Western metaphysics, an erotics of and in the feminine 
can substitute an organic rhythm "made possible by love that 
takes and gives time" (Irigaray 1993a, 143).<14>  
   The time of the passage between the sensible and the 
transcendental described by Irigaray, and by Levinas in 
voluptuosity, moves in this revivifying rhythm.  It works on the 
individual body as it does on the relation between lovers.  As a 
type of time, it closely resembles the temporality explored by 
Derrida in The post card: From Socrates to Freud and beyond, 
where the rhythm of history is described as a tension between 
"protentions" (envois) and "retentions" (renvois) (Derrida 
1987a; see also Hobson 1987).  For Irigaray and Levinas the 
history in question is that of the individual ethical/erotic 
subject, whose "growth" follows the same looping or limping 
motion as history itself.  In this feminine erotic temporality, 
advances are made, some kind of "progress" is achieved, but 
according to a rhythm of alternate acceleration and braking, a 
cyclical motion in which each cycle marks a shift of level in 
the constitution of the subject. 
   Is it not possible to detect this halting yet fecund movement 
in the shuttling back and forth of the voluptuous subject of 
Levinas's erotics? The passivity and tenderness that overtake 
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the virile and heroic "I" during the erotic relation are at 
least comparable to Irigaray's fertile passivity of bodily and 
amorous regeneration (see Irigaray 1993a, 25-28, 72-74).  
Although Levinas goes on to describe the sublation of 
voluptuousness into the fecundity of filiality, the passion of 
voluptuosity traces a passage between the sensible and the 
transcendental which is both carnal and spiritual, which has not 
yet been channeled into the procreation of the son.  On its own, 
the occurrence in Levinas's writing of oscillating feminine 
erotic difference clearly falls short of a feminist gesture, but 
the alterity introduced into his discourse by the evocation of 
voluptuosity may perhaps be read as a glimpse of the divinized 
and mutually fecund amorous relations that would characterize 
the third era of the West to which Irigaray looks forward, the 
age of the couple, or of the Spirit and the Bride. 
 
 
 
 
